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Abstract 
The use of investment treaty arbitration to decide public law raises concerns about 
judicial independence and impartiality. These concerns arise from the absence of 
institutional safeguards of independence that are otherwise present in public law 
adjudication at the domestic or international level. In this article, opportunities to 
use empirical methods to study possible bias in investment arbitration are 
surveyed. The discussion includes a brief consideration of qualitative methods and a 
critique of two quantitative studies on outcomes in investment arbitration. The 
discussion then turns to the methodology of an ongoing project involving legal 
content analysis of decisions by investment treaty tribunals. The main conclusion 
reached in the paper is that empirical research can make important contributions to 
scholarly understanding of investment arbitration. On the other hand, empirical 
research has important limitations in its ability to demonstrate the presence or 
absence of actual bias, even at a systemic level, thus reinforcing the need for 
institutional safeguards. 
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Introduction 
The importance of investment arbitration as a decision-making process warrants 
scrutiny of its design and performance. Empirical methods, alongside deductive 
reasoning and doctrinal analysis, may provide useful tools in this inquiry. Such 
methods can be used to initiate, reformulate, deflect, or clarify theories. They 
enable observations and insights that would not be possible without the systematic 
collection and analysis of information (Heise; Hall and Wright, p. 65-6). That said, 
empirical methods should be used with caution and modesty (Baldwin and Davis, p. 
880-1; Merton, p. 103; Tyree). Empirical research has important limitations in its 
ability to provide definitive answers on whether inappropriate factors have 
influenced or will influence specific decisions (Sisk and Heise, p. 746 and 794). 
 
There are numerous options for socio-legal research on potential bias in 
adjudication. In this paper, the discussion begins with a conceptualization of bias in 
investment arbitration and an outline of hypotheses arising from the 
conceptualization. The potentially constructive role of qualitative methods is then 
highlighted. Next, two recent studies are discussed that sought to use quantitative 
or statistical methods to test for bias in investment arbitration. Finally, the 
methodology of an ongoing project based on a legal content analysis of awards is 
outlined as an alternative or supplemental approach to researching possible bias.  
 
Used with care, empirical methods may reveal new information and insights and 
thus advance our understanding of social phenomena. Yet none of the approaches 
to empirical research as discussed in this paper offer clear answers to concerns 
about fairness and integrity in investment arbitration arising from its institutional 
structure. Indeed, the limitations of empirical research in the study of adjudicative 
bias point to the importance of establishing an institutional structure of adjudication 
that accounts for reasonably perceived bias. Fairness and integrity in adjudication 
must be ensured ultimately at the institutional level due to the incomplete 
knowledge of the parties and the public about the mindsets of individual decision-
makers. An important concern in investment arbitration, therefore, is whether its 
structure allays reasonable concerns about bias so as to support public confidence 
in the process (e.g. R v Valente, para. 22). 
 
1. Conceptual background 
In this section of the paper, the concept of bias in investment arbitration is 
elaborated with a view to highlighting the potential relevance of different 
approaches to empirical research (Berg, p. 25). The focus here is on theories that 
provide rationales for expectations of bias in investment treaty arbitration, following 
from its characterization as a unique form of public law adjudication constituted at 
the international level (see Van Harten (2007)). 
 
The use of arbitration to decide public law on a final basis is unique to investment 
treaty arbitration. This raises special concerns about independence and fairness in 
the process. Perceptions of bias may follow especially from the lack of institutional 
safeguards of judicial independence and the absence of a robust process of judicial 
review. These concerns are germane to investment treaty arbitration because it 
combines several characteristics, as follows. 
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Public law dynamic of claims against the state: In investment treaty arbitration, 
unlike in most fields of international adjudication, states have given their general 
and prospective authorization for claims to be brought by private parties (typically, 
owners of assets of substantial value) against a state acting in its sovereign 
capacity, without the possibility of reciprocal claims by the relevant state against 
those private parties. 
 
Autonomy from domestic courts and tribunals: Under many investment treaties, 
unlike any other international adjudicative arrangement that allows for claims by 
private parties’ against states in their sovereign capacity, the customary duty of a 
person to resort to domestic remedies – before an international claim can be 
brought on the person’s behalf – is removed or heavily restricted. 
 
Remedy of state liability: Unlike other regimes of judicial review, especially at the 
domestic level, the primary remedy in the system is that of a damages award 
against the state following a finding of unlawful sovereign conduct. 
 
International enforceability: Unlike other decisions and awards in public law, 
investment treaty awards are enforceable in numerous countries with limited or no 
opportunity for judicial review. 
 
Due to this combination of features, arbitrators acting under investment treaties 
are authorized to resolve questions of public law without the prospect of judicial 
review by a court, whether domestic or international. This raises concerns about 
independence and impartiality in the adjudicative process because it permits the 
final resolution of public law outside of any court, whether domestic or international 
(Van Harten (2008)). Institutional safeguards of independence that are otherwise 
present in the judicial resolution of public law are not present. These safeguards 
include, for example, judicial security of tenure, bars on outside remuneration by 
the judge, and an objective method of assignment of judges to individual cases. 
Without such safeguards, a perception of bias may arise that decision-making by 
investment treaty arbitrators may be influenced by inappropriate factors. 
 
These inappropriate factors include, in particular, the financial and career interests 
of arbitrators who aspire to re-appointment and who may have an interest to 
promote the arbitration industry as an alternative to other forms of decision-
making. Such factors point to the apparent dependencies of arbitrators on at least 
three sets of actors: (a) those who act as senior gatekeepers or otherwise wield 
influence in the arbitration industry; (b) those who exercise power in the arbitration 
centres that operate as appointing authorities under the treaties;1 and (c) those 
(here, investors) who in the asymmetrical context of public law adjudication are 
able to initiate claims. Each of these groups of actors has influence over the 
financial or career success of arbitrators by triggering the use of the system, by 
appointing or green-lighting arbitrators, by deciding conflict of interest claims 
against arbitrators, by employing arbitrators in their wider professional contexts, or 
by otherwise shaping on a case-by-case basis the demand for the services of 
investment arbitrators and the arbitration industry. 
 
                                                 
1 The primary arbitration centres are the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
in Washington, the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 
and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. 
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This brief outline of factors offers a set of rationales for empirical study of possible 
bias in investment arbitration. The perceptions follow from the unique institutional 
design of the process and especially from the absence of safeguards of judicial 
independence and robust judicial review. In this respect, the critique offers a basis 
for further research on expectations of bias and the institutional context. As 
examples, one might consider these hypotheses: 
 
If arbitrators have an interest to encourage claims, then one is unlikely to see large 
numbers of claims dismissed at the jurisdictional or merits stage. 
 
If arbitrators are sympathetic to the interests of business actors, then one is 
unlikely to see widespread state-friendly interpretations of ambiguous language in 
investment treaties. 
 
If arbitrators are inclined to please influential actors in the arbitration institutions, 
then one is less likely to see claims dismissed when brought by investors of 
powerful states that wield influence within these institutions and more likely to see 
claims dismissed when brought against such states. 
 
If arbitrators are worried that powerful states may reject use of the system, one is 
likely to see arbitrators adopt relatively sympathetic approaches to treaty 
constraints on states in cases against powerful states and stricter approaches in 
cases brought by investors of those states. 
 
These are some expectations that follow from the theoretical framework of possible 
bias arising from the institutional structure of investment treaty arbitration. They 
could be tested at a systemic level by the use of empirical methods, even if only 
tentatively and with various limitations that would preclude any strong conclusions 
about actual bias in the system (let alone in particular cases) or about the degree 
to which there is a basis for perceived bias arising from institutional factors. 
 
Importantly, one should not mistake an evaluation of the institutional structure of 
an adjudicative system for a comprehensive theory of the behaviour of adjudicators 
in that adjudicative system. A range of factors and complex interactions of factors 
will be present in the thought processes of adjudicators and the deliberations of 
tribunals. One may hope and trust that the predominant factors under 
consideration by arbitrators are concerns for fairness and integrity. However, the 
difficulties of establishing what factors have guided the actual decisions in specific 
cases make it vital – for the sake of the public, the parties, and the adjudicators 
themselves – to incorporate institutional safeguards of independence. Otherwise, 
and regardless of actual outcomes, reasonable doubts may linger that a decision 
was unfair. Fundamentally, the limitations of our ability to know the mindset of a 
decision-maker in any specific case, including by the use of empirical methods, 
warrants the incorporation of institutional safeguards. 
 
 
 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 5 
Gus Van Harten   Contributions and Limitations 
2. Qualitative research on investment arbitration 
Discussions of empirical research often focus on the use of quantitative and 
statistical methods (e.g. Schuck). However, qualitative methods provide a useful 
means by which to examine decision-making by uncovering unquantifiable facts 
about people and phenomena (Berg, p. 7). Like quantitative methods, their use 
involves testing specific hypotheses of how theoretical expectations will manifest 
themselves in observable phenomena. For example, in the present context, it might 
be useful to conduct interviews with participants in investment arbitration in order 
to gather their views about how the system operates and about the implications of 
the absence of safeguards of judicial independence in the system. Interview and 
survey-based studies have been conducted on the impacts of investment treaties 
for decision-making about foreign investment (e.g. Yackee (2010)) and there is 
room for further qualitative study of the arbitration process. 
 
On the other hand, the issue of actual bias – whether arbitrators individually or as a 
group are influenced by inappropriate factors in the resolution of legal issues or 
disputes – would be challenging and perhaps impossible to test reliably using 
interviews or surveys (Wagner and Petherbridge, p. 1125-6). Even the unworkable 
option of questioning adjudicators under oath about whether they will be, are, or 
were influenced by inappropriate factors in their decisions might not provide 
sufficient reassurance where there is no way to verify independently the 
adjudicator’s own reports of his or her state of mind. This problem is recognized in 
legal doctrine stressing the importance of institutional safeguards to counter 
perceptions of bias (e.g. Locabail, p. 471-2). 
 
Sophisticated qualitative work has not been conducted on the adjudicative process 
in investment treaty arbitration. However, sophisticated work was carried out in the 
field of international commercial arbitration and this work demonstrated how 
qualitative methods can be used to gather information that elaborates on the 
conceptualization of decision-making in international arbitration. The seminal study 
is Dealing in Virtue by Dezalay and Garth (1996). In this study, Dezalay and Garth 
examined international commercial arbitration as an autonomous legal field in a 
global marketplace by interviewing about 300 participants in the field. The study is 
relevant to the issue of possible bias in investment arbitration mainly for the 
context that it provides about the world of international arbitration as a business 
activity. There is a lot of overlap between the arbitrators, lawyers, law firms, 
arbitration rules, arbitration centres, and treaty arrangements that operate or apply 
in international commercial arbitration and investment treaty arbitration. 
 
To illustrate, the following observations by Dezalay and Garth in their study of 
international arbitration assist in elaborating rationales for possible bias based on 
the absence of institutional safeguards in investment arbitration, as outlined above. 
These observations are clearly not fully explanative of the state of affairs in 
investment arbitration. That said, they do pinpoint and elaborate some reasons to 
suspect or perceive bias in situations where international arbitration is tasked with 
the final resolution of public law: 
 
The operation of the market in the selection of arbitrators... provides a key to 
understanding the justice that emerges from the decisions of arbitrators (Dezalay 
and Garth, p. 9). 
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The new generation of technocrats... emphasizes their ability to satisfy the 
consumers in order to gain repeat business (p. 194). 
 
For the lawyers and their justice, the question is how to affirm the autonomy 
necessary for legitimacy while at the same time manifesting sufficient fidelity to the 
economic powers who must in the end find these services worth purchasing and 
deploying (p. 70). 
 
It is good arbitration politics to thank business lawyers or other acquaintances who 
bring nice arbitration matters by letting them have limited access to the arbitration 
market. This system of exchange of favors is essential to success in arbitration, a 
career dependent on personal relations (p. 124). 
 
The growth of the market in arbitration is also evident in the competition that can 
be seen among different national approaches and centres (p. 7).  
 
They [the newcomer arbitrators of the 1980s and 1990s] present themselves... as 
international arbitration professionals, and also as entrepreneurs selling their 
services to business practitioners... (p. 36).  
 
The ICC [International Chamber of Commerce] has... become one of the principal 
places where the “politics” of arbitration is elaborated and expressed. There are 
innumerable committees and multiple networks of influence that gravitate around 
this institution. The [ICC International Court of Arbitration], for example, which is 
really an oversight committee that reviews arbitration appointments and decisions, 
appears to be particularly sensitive to the business clientele... (p. 45). 
 
The multinational companies are in this way investing in the construction of these 
legal services that serve them (p. 93). 
 
These observations convey that arbitrators operate in a marketplace in which each 
is a supplier of symbolic capital arising from his or her reputation. As operators in 
the market, each has an interest to further his or her position and that of the 
industry overall (Dezalay and Garth, p. 8 and 18). With the passing of the old 
generation of “gentleman” arbitrators in the 1980s and 1990s, a new generation of 
technocrat arbitrators was found to be more likely to seek to promote their industry 
or preferred arbitration forum in relation to its competitors (Dezalay and Garth, p. 
50). 
 
Naturally, some arbitrators would have a greater connection than others to the 
enterprise of the arbitration industry or a particular arbitration centre. In light of 
Dezalay and Garth’s observations, one could attempt to measure the degree of an 
arbitrator’s connection to the industry by gauging the frequency of the arbitrator’s 
appointment in the relevant field of arbitration. The assumption would be that 
arbitrators appointed more often have a greater career stake in the relevant field 
than those appointed less often. In turn, one would expect frequently-appointed 
arbitrators to take greater care to respond to the interests of powerful actors, as 
laid out above. These are examples of how one might draw on the observations of 
Dezalay and Garth in order to refine and test theoretical expectations about 
decision-making in investment arbitration. 
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Another observation of Dezalay and Garth was that international arbitration consists 
of networks of cross-connected players who affiliate around prominent centres of 
arbitration, such as the International Chamber of Commerce. One could seek to 
examine this point in the context of investment arbitration by identifying the 
prominent appointing authorities. In order of priority, based on the frequency of 
claims in different forums, these appear to be ICSID (in Washington), the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (the Hague), the International Chamber of 
Commerce (Paris), and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. Alternatively, one 
could seek to elaborate the professional backgrounds of arbitrators (see Costa), 
perhaps focusing on those who are appointed most frequently. This would allow 
further testing of Dezalay and Garth’s observations that arbitrators tend to come 
from a discrete professional community and social milieu. 
 
Another observation of Dezalay and Garth highlighted how prominent arbitrators 
may name each other for appointments and exclude those who are not part of the 
industry. To what degree, if at all, does this happen in investment arbitration? One 
way to test this would be to collect information about the identity of legal counsel 
and of arbitrators in specific cases and to look for correlations between individuals. 
If one saw that X was appointed where Y was counsel and that Y was appointed 
where X was counsel, this would support the finding of cross-connections based on 
Dezalay and Garth’s work. In turn, it might raise questions about the degree to 
which arbitrator decision-making is influenced by the identity of counsel appearing 
before the arbitrator or by the influence of prominent counsel over the re-
appointment of arbitrators. 
 
These are a few examples of how the qualitative work of Dezalay and Garth, 
informed by the conceptualization of independence and impartiality in public law 
that was laid out in a previous section of this paper, could be used to refine 
expectations about possible bias in investment arbitration. This indicates how 
qualitative research can enrich understanding of decision-making even if it cannot 
prove or dis-prove actual bias in specific cases or affirm or dispel reasons for 
perceived bias. There are, of course, many opportunities for further research. For 
example, it appears that persons from outside the realm of commercial arbitration 
have been appointed increasingly to decide investor-state disputes. Do these 
persons come from different professional networks and do they approach their role 
differently from Dezalay and Garth’s technocrat arbitrators? 
 
3. Quantitative research on investment arbitration 
There have been a handful of studies that seek to test hypotheses of possible bias 
in investment arbitration. In this section, after elaborating on the issue of relevance 
in empirical research, I review briefly two examples: Franck (2009) and McArthur 
and Ormachea (2009).2 Both focus on hypotheses of actual bias at a systemic level 
rather than of actual bias in specific cases or perceived bias arising from 
institutional factors. Each provides an interesting elaboration of empirical research, 
although the findings in the studies are mixed and inconclusive, especially due to 
the lack of data. Both also have important limitations and in some cases flaws, 
including a tendency – especially in Franck’s study – to mis-state or over-state 
conclusions (see Garth, p. 103-4). This latter point highlights the need for caution 
in the use of empirical methods and for particular scrutiny of empirical research 
                                                 
2 A more extensive review of both studies, which as I understand may include responses from the 
authors of the two studies, is forthcoming in the Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy. 
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where it purports to connect statistical findings to strong statements of findings and 
conclusions. 
 
A. The general issue of relevance 
 
Dezalay and Garth’s study of international arbitration was discussed in the previous 
section of this paper. It was indicated that some of the conclusions reached in that 
study had a degree of relevance to investment arbitration, but that the primary 
focus of the study was on other research topics, primarily relating to commercial 
arbitration. One can relate the findings of Dezalay and Garth to questions of bias in 
investment treaty arbitration only with caution. In doing so, one should focus on 
observations that follow from the original research assumptions and that are 
relevant to distinct research questions concerning possible bias in investment 
arbitration. 
 
The same points about relevance apply to quantitative research. Indeed, it is 
particularly important to connect the design of a quantitative project to a specific 
research question and hypothesis, given the demands of statistical analysis and the 
need to track assumptions underlying the reduction of qualitative phenomena to 
numerical representations (Aitken and Taroni, p. 203). If one is not careful about 
how the numbers are presented, they may be given undue weight by readers who 
do not understand the assumptions and limitations behind the researcher’s 
quantitative findings. 
 
B. Review of Franck (2009) 
 
Franck examined hypotheses arising from certain factors that could generate bias in 
investment arbitration. These factors involved possible prejudices of arbitrators 
linked to their nationality and/ or the identity of the respondent state. Both factors 
were grouped according to the “development status” of arbitrators and countries 
and then compared to the outcomes in cases (Franck (2009), p. 438). The 
researcher’s hypothesis was that development status would not affect outcome and 
“that arbitrators can make decisions neutrally on the basis of the facts and law” 
(Franck (2009), p. 454). As designed, the study tested the first element of this 
hypothesis, and led to further conclusions on the second element. 
 
To test the hypothesis, the researcher analyzed outcomes in 52 treaty cases with 
publicly-available awards. Two measures were then applied to classify the 
development status of presiding arbitrators and respondent states in those cases. 
The first measure was OECD membership; presiding arbitrators and respondent 
countries were treated as “developed” if they (or their countries of nationality) were 
members of the OECD and as “developing” if they were not OECD members. 
Second, presiding arbitrators and respondent countries were classified based on the 
World Bank income classification system, which divides countries into low income, 
lower-middle income, upper-middle income, and high income categories.3 Based on 
                                                 
3 In classifying outcomes, the researcher characterized as a win for the respondent state an award of no 
damages against the state; and treated as a loss an award of damages against the state. Second, the 
researcher evaluated outcome in terms of the amounts of money awarded in cases where the claimant 
was successful. Due to limitations in the available data, the researcher’s sample was reduced to 49 cases 
Gus Van Harten   Contributions and Limitations 
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this analysis, the researcher did not find reliable evidence of variations between 
case outcomes linked to the development status of presiding arbitrators and 
respondent countries. In turn, Franck reached various conclusions about the 
integrity and fairness of investment arbitration. 
 
The outline of the methodology used in this study is commendable for its clarity and 
transparency. However, the study has important limitations and in some cases 
flaws. Most important is the extent to which the researcher over-stated or mis-
stated certain findings and conclusions. The following are examples.4 
 
In the study’s abstract, it is stated: 
 
“The results demonstrate that, at the macro level, development status does not 
have a statistically significant relationship with outcome. This suggests that the 
investment treaty arbitration system, as a whole, functions fairly and that the 
eradication or radical overhaul of the arbitration process is unnecessary.” (Franck 
(2009), p. 435). 
 
In the text of the study, regarding the results on development status and win/ loss 
rates, it is stated that the consistency of her results “offers a powerful narrative 
that there is procedural integrity in investment arbitration” (p. 464). 
 
In the text of the study, regarding the results on development status and amount 
of damages awarded, it is stated that the “lack of a main effect for a respondent’s 
development status stands in sharp contrast to the assertions that investment 
treaty arbitration unfairly privileges the developed world or improperly harms the 
developing world” (p. 470). 
 
In the study’s conclusion, it is stated: 
 
“The notion that outcome is not associated with arbitrator or respondent 
development status should be a basis for cautious optimism. It provides evidence 
about the integrity of arbitration and casts doubt on the assumption that arbitrators 
from developed states show a bias in terms of arbitration outcomes or that the 
development status of respondent states affects such outcomes. It suggests that 
major structural overhaul may not be necessary because it is not clear that 
arbitration is inherently predisposed towards particular outcomes.” (p. 487). 
 
These statements were misplaced for various reasons, summarized below. 
 
The study suffered from a gross lack of data which led to a 40 to 80% risk of error 
across most of the results.5 The researcher did not report this high risk of error – 
                                                                                                                                               
for the OECD measure and 47 or 49 cases (depending on whether a win/ loss or total damages outcome 
was being measured) for the World Bank measure. 
4 A companion study by Franck (2007) was also reviewed in the research for this paper. 
5 To elaborate, a claim of statistical significance about a hypothesized connection (or lack of connection) 
between variables requires sufficient data to remove significant risks that apparent relationships are 
explained by chance. The researcher calculated the number of awards needed to generate reliable 
findings (on the chosen standard, findings that carried a 20% chance of error). Depending on the 
Gus Van Harten   Contributions and Limitations 
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and the corresponding finding that there was insufficient data to test reliably the 
hypotheses of the study – alongside the above statements of conclusions about the 
fairness and integrity of investment arbitration. The lack of data precluded the 
drawing of conclusions to support or refute the hypothesis that development status 
would not affect outcome. 
 
In the study, the high risk of error was identified in a series of footnotes (Franck 
(2009), p. 461-70 (various footnotes)). However, the main conclusion drawn by the 
researcher from this risk of error was that further research should be conducted. In 
fact, the risk of error should have precluded the study’s main conclusions, as 
quoted above. Problematically, Franck relied on the lack of reliable evidence of a 
hypothesized link between development status and outcome to infer that there was 
no link between development status and outcome (Franck (2009), p. 460-2). This 
inference does not follow because it is possible – indeed, it is to be expected in light 
of the limited data – that there would not  be reliable evidence of either possibility 
(i.e. of either a link or the absence of a link). 
 
Likewise, due to the lack of reliability of the results, the study did not establish that 
“development status does not have a statistically significant relationship with 
outcome”, as was concluded by the researcher (Franck (2009), p. 435). And, the 
high risk of error should have precluded the researcher from reporting that 
“outcome is not associated with arbitrator or respondent development status” 
(Franck (2009), p. 487). Although not highlighted by the researcher, the clearest 
conclusion to be drawn from the study was simply that there was insufficient data 
to test the hypothesis with an acceptable degree of reliability. 
 
In the study, developed-country status was equated with OECD membership. 
However, some OECD countries are reasonably regarded as developing or transition 
countries. Following a review by the present author of the study’s results,6 it 
emerged that 44% of the 18 cases classified in the study as against developed 
countries were cases against Mexico and 17% were cases against the Czech 
Republic or the Slovak Republic. If one were to treat these countries as developing 
or transition countries, then 61% of the cases classified as being against developed 
countries (and 22% of the total cases) would need to be re-classified. The 
significance of these cases as a proportion of the cases classified as being against 
developed countries, and the lack of disclosure about these coding outcomes in the 
study itself, raises a concern that the OECD measure might have been chosen in 
order to even out the cases against developed versus developing countries in a 
limited dataset. Although use of the OECD measure in the study was balanced by 
the use of the World Bank measure, discussed below, the lack of transparency 
about the implications and limitations of the OECD measure was problematic. 
 
The World Bank income classification system was also in the study as a measure of 
development status. This was a more sophisticated measure than the OECD 
measure and it was commendable for the researcher to use both of the measures. 
However, the use of the World Bank measure was also frustrated by the lack of 
                                                                                                                                               
measure, between 382 and 781 awards were required (Franck (2009), p. 461-70 (various footnotes)). 
However, the available sample sizes in the study were between 47 and 49 awards. This generated a 40 
to 80% chance of error (so-called “Type II error”, which refers to the risk of a false negative) across 
most of the study’s results. 
6 Following requests to the researcher and an attempt to replicate an aspect of the study, the data for 
Franck (2009) was provided to the author. This enabled the review of the data relating to the OECD 
measure as summarized in this paper. 
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data. There were no cases decided by presiding arbitrators from low income 
countries and there was only one case decided by a presiding arbitrator from a 
lower-middle income country. As a result, all but one of the cases classified in the 
study as being decided by a “developed country” presiding arbitrator involved an 
arbitrator from an upper-middle income country (Franck (2009), p. 459). The 
researcher was transparent about this limitation of the study. However, the lack of 
data nevertheless undermined the relative sophistication of the World Bank 
measure and was a further reason to moderate the study’s conclusions. 
 
The study also used winsorized data, meaning that the available data was truncated 
to remove “outliers” (Franck (2009), p. 456). However, winsorizing works best with 
data that is symmetric and creates biases with data that is non-symmetric. The 
monetary awards reviewed in the study were not symmetric, which justified 
discarding the winsorized method. Further, when winsorizing data, it is typical to 
truncate 20 to 25% of the data. However, the tables for winsorized and non-
winsorized data have the same number of cases (49) and it is not clear how other 
data was substituted for the “outliers” and whether this might have led to the loss 
of important information about the actual dataset (Franck (2009), p. 465-8).7 
Finally, the overall lack of data in could mean that all of the data should be treated 
as outliers. 
 
Leaving aside these important limitations of the study, Franck’s statements of 
conclusions focused on a limited and selective set of explanations for the results – 
especially the possibility that the system functions fairly – while neglecting others. 
One of many alternative explanations was the possibility that arbitrators do not 
make decisions based on nationality but rather on their membership in a common 
culture or industry of arbitrators. Another was the possibility that the facts of cases 
involving developing countries are more or less favourable to investors than the 
facts of cases involving developed states, and that these differences should lead us 
to expect variations in outcomes. That is, even if it did find reliable evidence of 
either a link or no link between development status and outcomes, the study would 
have benefited from greater clarity about the fact and range of alternative 
explanations for the results. 
 
The study examined only narrow aspects of questions about bias in investment 
arbitration. There was insufficient data to answer reliably the hypotheses of the 
study. Regardless of its results, then, the study could not provide a “powerful 
narrative” for or against the procedural integrity of the system (Franck (2009), p. 
464). Likewise, the statement that the study “suggests that the investment treaty 
arbitration system, as a whole, functions fairly and that the eradication or radical 
overhaul of the arbitration process is unnecessary” (Franck (2009), p. 435) was 
over-stated in light of the limitations of the study. Far more information involving a 
wide range of factors, examined in numerous studies, would be required to 
contemplate these sort of conclusions. 
 
To be clear, this critique of the study does not lead to the conclusion that it offered 
any reliable evidence of bias or of a lack of fairness or integrity in investment 
arbitration. The key lesson is that there is too little information available to draw 
reliable conclusions either way. More broadly, these problems with the study are 
not flaws with empirical methods in general but with the way in which those 
                                                 
7 I am grateful to an anonymous peer reviewer of a related article and to Lauge Poulsen for pointing out 
these limitations of the winsorizing method. 
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methods were employed in one study. An earlier study by Franck provided useful 
descriptive data on investment arbitration and demonstrated how empirical 
research can advance understanding of what is happening in the system (Franck 
(2007)). However, this review of the present study indicates that a researcher must 
present findings and conclusions accurately and with care. Otherwise, there is a 
danger that readers, including policy makers, will take up a study for positions that 
the research does not support, as appears to have happened in the case of Franck’s 
work.8 
 
C. Review of McArthur and Ormachea (2009) 
 
Another study that sought to test arbitrator performance, including in relation to 
possible bias, was carried out by McArthur and Ormachea. Their approach was to 
review ICSID decisions on jurisdiction (up to February 2007), arising both from 
investment contracts and from investment treaties, to assess whether jurisdiction 
was accepted or declined by the tribunal. This aspect of case outcomes was then 
evaluated against a series of variables, including the legal basis for the claim (i.e. 
contract or treaty), the economic status of the claimant’s state of nationality and of 
the respondent state, and the institutional quality of the respondent state. 
 
The researchers reported a number of findings and highlighted three as the most 
provocative.9 The first was that ICSID tribunals rarely dismissed claims on 
jurisdictional grounds. The second was that tribunals were more likely to dismiss 
claims on jurisdictional grounds where the claim was brought under an investment 
contract rather than an investment treaty. The third was that tribunals were less 
likely to dismiss claims by investors from the wealthiest countries. 
  
Relative to the study by Franck that was reviewed above, McArthur and Ormachea 
were modest and cautious in presenting their conclusions. The study was framed as 
a “first step toward the development of a comprehensive empirical literature” on 
ICSID arbitration (McArthur and Ormachea, p. 562). Its main concluding statement 
was as follows (McArthur and Ormachea, p. 583): 
 
The integrity and neutrality of the ICSID system are thus of the utmost importance. 
Our study on the jurisdictional jurisprudence represents an important first step 
towards developing a literature that facilitates understanding and awareness of 
these issues. 
 
This statement does not make strong claims about the reliability of findings or over-
state conclusions. In large part, the researchers took the approach of laying out 
their results without engaging in a stretched commentary on their significance 
(McArthur and Ormachea, p. 563 and 582-3). Even so, there are aspects of the 
                                                 
8 See the separate statement by a member of the U.S. Model BIT Review committee, Mark Kantor, who 
cited Franck’s conclusion on development status and outcome in support of his position against reform of 
the U.S. Model BIT. United States, Report of the Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy 
Regarding the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (30 September 2009), Annex B (Particular Viewpoints 
of Subcommittee Members), Statement of Mark Kantor, p. 28-9. 
9 The researchers did not offer much explanation for why these findings were thought to be provocative 
other than to report that they contradicted the researchers’ expectations (McArthur and Ormachea, p. 
574). 
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study, especially involving the conclusions drawn, that are problematic. These are 
summarized below. 
 
In the first place, the researchers mentioned issues of interest to them in the 
conduct of the study, including possible bias in investment arbitration (McArthur 
and Ormachea, p. 564, 576, and 583). However, they did not identify any a priori 
hypothesis of the study. 
 
In some cases, the researchers appeared not to be familiar with theoretical 
rationales for expected bias in investment arbitration. For example, they did not 
connect the descriptive finding that arbitrators were less likely to accept jurisdiction 
in cases under investment contracts than investment treaties (McArthur and 
Ormachea, p. 574) to expectations of pro-investor bias in investment treaty 
arbitration. The expectations of perceived bias outlined earlier in this paper suggest 
that arbitrators acting under investment treaties (as opposed to investment 
contracts) might have an incentive to decide issues in favour claimants so as to 
encourage future claims. This is because, under the treaties, investment arbitration 
is asymmetrical in that only investors can initiate a case against states; in contrast, 
in contract arbitration both states and investors can typically bring claims against 
each other.10  
 
In some respects, the researchers were not rigorous and transparent in describing 
their methodology.11 For example, they stated that they each coded independently 
a small sample of each other’s cases (McArthur and Ormachea, p. 564) but did not 
indicate the number of cases subjected to this double-coding and the level of 
consistency (i.e. inter-coder reliability) obtained. Also, while the researchers 
discussed some coding challenges, such as the problem of how to code cases with 
multiple claimants, they did not identify or discuss other apparent issues.12 
 
It is difficult to determine from the study precisely how many cases were coded and 
the relevant breakdown for each of the researchers’ analyses, making it difficult to 
evaluate the significance of the results. However, the researchers listed in an 
appendix to the study all of the cases reviewed with a summary of the coding 
results. This was helpful because it allows other researchers to replicate the process 
of the study, including simply by coding the same cases for the same variables. 
 
The researchers did not attempt to calculate the statistical significance or effect 
sizes of the results. That said, unlike in Franck (2009), the researchers did not state 
any findings in terms of statistical significance. Generally speaking, the study was 
                                                 
10 This is not to suggest that this descriptive information on jurisdictional outcomes under investment 
contracts should be interpreted to support expectations of pro-claimant bias. This interpretation would 
derive from only one of many possible explanations for the finding, which is based on very limited data. 
11 This was partly because the researchers relied (reasonably) on measures of economic status and 
institutional quality that were drawn from outside sources. Also, without wishing to downplay the useful 
contributions of the study, it should be noted that the researchers were legal practitioners, not 
academics, and thus may have had less background on methodology or less time to commit to 
developing a more rigorous methodology. 
12 For example, the researchers reported that they coded cases for the existence of a “claim based on a 
breach of [a] contract” with a government entity (McArthur and Ormachea, p. 566). However, it was not 
clear whether and how this was coded in any situations where a claim was brought under an investment 
treaty but based on an argument of a breach of a contract (e.g. in the case of an umbrella clause in the 
treaty). One assumes that this issue was resolved in a reasonable way but it would have been helpful to 
see the issue identified and explained. 
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presented appropriately as simply a tentative outline of descriptive information 
about ICSID arbitration. 
 
The study was based on limited data (74 cases were classified in the analysis of 
ICSID jurisdictional outcomes) and, in some instances, McArthur and Ormachea did 
not moderate their conclusions in light of the limited data. For example, it was 
reported that tribunals were less likely to accept jurisdiction when the respondent 
state had a low score of institutional quality (McArthur and Ormachea, p. 576). 
However, the data on this variable was extraordinarily limited; for countries with 
high institutional quality, 1 of 8 cases was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, 
while for countries with low institutional quality, 2 of 7 cases were dismissed. In 
light of this limited data, the researchers described the finding of a possible 
connection between high institutional quality and the acceptance of jurisdiction as 
tentative (McArthur and Ormachea, p. 576). Yet they returned to this finding in the 
study’s conclusion, as discussed below. 
 
In the study’s conclusion, it was not appropriate to claim that the data 
demonstrated “that investors are always better off relying on a BIT to establish 
jurisdiction” (McArthur and Ormachea, p. 582) and to state that “claims are most 
likely to fail against those very same countries where an investor had the best 
reasons to demand international arbitration protections...” (McArthur and 
Ormachea, p. 583). These predictive claims were not supported by the study.  
 
Some statements in the conclusion suggest that the researchers may have 
approached their project with some pre-set conclusions. For example, in the text of 
the study the researchers identified as “striking” and a “remarkable finding” the 
descriptive information that U.S. investors were 40% less likely to have their claims 
rejected on jurisdictional grounds (McArthur and Ormachea, p. 581). However, the 
researchers did not mention this finding in their concluding statements about the 
possibility of pro-investor bias. By itself this would be fine, but the researchers 
opted instead to highlight that investors were more likely to see their claims 
rejected where the host state had poor institutional quality and, in turn, to cite this 
as something that “undermines the contention that the entire international 
arbitration system evinces an undue preference for investor interests over state 
interests” (McArthur and Ormachea, p. 583). There are various problems with this 
statement, including the exceptionally limited data on institutional quality and the 
lack of explanation for why the results should be taken to reflect a pro- or anti-
investor bias. It would have been more appropriate to convey simply that the 
study’s results presented mixed and inconclusive evidence on possible bias, and 
perhaps to highlight the relevance and reliability of the highly tentative descriptive 
results in either direction. Relative to Franck, however, the researchers were more 
cautious about the presentation of results and conclusions. 
 
4. Methodology of a legal content analysis project 
The two studies discussed above focused on the classification of investment 
arbitration decisions based on their outcomes. This is a valid approach to gathering 
and analyzing information about adjudication. But there are also important 
limitations of an outcome-based approach (Hall and Wright, p. 85-7; Wagner and 
Petherbridge, p. 1127-8). For example, data on outcomes as a measure of actual 
performance is open to a range of alternative explanations such as variations in the 
strength of parties’ claims, diversity of fact situations, possible inflation by 
claimants of amounts claimed, procedural variations among forums, varying 
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experience levels and incentives among arbitrators, and varying political influences 
of states and private actors. It is also very difficult, if not impossible, to identify the 
“appropriate” or “fair” spread of outcomes against which actual outcomes are to be 
measured. Related to this is the problem that data on outcomes at one or another 
stage of a case do not capture aspects of tribunal decisions – such interpretations 
of the law – that may reflect bias independently of outcome. Also, cumulative data 
on case outcomes does not explain whether some element of the decision-making 
in any particular case was influenced by inappropriate factors. As such, there will 
always remain a prospect for perceived pro-investor or pro-state bias in any case 
based on inadequacies of the institutional structure. This is a concern that 
institutional safeguards of judicial independence are meant to address. 
 
Alternative approaches to empirical research may be useful to supplement 
outcome-based studies. In this section of the paper, the methodology of an ongoing 
project is outlined, especially as it relates to the collection and coding of data. The 
project relies on an analysis of the legal content of investment treaty awards rather 
than of outcomes (Hall and Wright; Neuendorf; Krippendorf; Stemler). The purpose 
of this outline of the project is not to proselytize for legal content analysis as a form 
of empirical legal research (Hall and Wright, p. 64) or to augment criticisms 
conveyed in the previous section. It is simply to introduce an ongoing project and 
its methodology. Because the project is ongoing, results and findings are not 
reported. When findings are reported, they should be scrutinized carefully and 
criticized for any mis-statements or over-statements of findings and conclusions or 
for any other flaws. 
 
A. Overall aims 
 
The purpose of the project was to collect descriptive information on awards (and 
other decisions) in investment treaty arbitration. Of particular interest was the 
degree to which different awards may reflect different approaches to the resolution 
of legal issues. A more specific objective was to test hypotheses that followed from 
the absence of institutional safeguards of independence in investment arbitration.13 
Methodologically, the project was conceived as an experiment in legal content 
analysis, motivated by an aspiration to produce research that combined inter-
disciplinary research tools in order to avoid the methodological weaknesses of each 
tool operating in isolation. The project blended the legal expertise of a researcher in 
the analysis of legal content of investment treaty awards with the statistical 
expertise of a research collaborator.14 Legal expertise was employed primarily to 
pinpoint hypotheses and to refine the data collection process in order to provide a 
sophisticated base of data for the statistical analysis (Yackee (2008)). The 
statistical analysis was in turn designed and implemented primarily by an expert in 
statistics (Hall and Wright). This, it was hoped, would enhance the role of legal 
expertise as a component of empirical legal research and avoid limitations of 
                                                 
13 The three hypotheses under examination were that (a) arbitrators would tend to adopt expansive 
approaches to legal issues more frequently than restrictive approaches; (b) the tendency toward 
expansive approaches would be accentuated for claims by investors of the U.S., U.K., Germany, and 
France as major capital-exporters, powers within the appointing authorities, and historical treaty-makers 
in the system; and (c) the tendency would shift toward restrictive approaches for claims against the 
U.S., U.K, Germany, and France Data analysis to test these hypotheses is still underway. 
14 The collaborator was a law student, now graduated and working in immigration law, who was 
previously a Senior Analyst with Statistics Canada. A second statistician has been engaged to develop 
statistical models to test and analyze the data.   
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outcome-based research that is carried out by legal researchers who are not 
statisticians. 
 
B. Identification of issues and description of issue resolutions 
 
Awards were coded for the presence and resolution of any of seven a priori issues 
of law. All of the issues related primarily to the topics of jurisdiction or admissibility, 
although in some cases they also engaged other types of legal issues. The focus on 
issues of jurisdiction and admissibility had no special attraction. It was chosen to 
provide an initial basis by which to organize the classification system and coding 
process, leaving options for further research that focused on substantive standards 
or procedural aspects of investment law. 
 
The seven issues, and different interpretive approaches to each, were identified and 
described in advance based on a review of existing awards and secondary 
literature. Where an issue was found to have arisen in a case, each arbitrator’s 
resolution of the issue was classified as expansive, restrictive, or “non-
classifiable”.15 The expansive and restrictive approaches to each issue were defined 
in advance. They reflected interpretive approaches that tended either to enlarge or 
reduce the compensatory promise of investment treaty arbitration for prospective 
claimants and, in turn, the liability risk for states. “Non-classifiable” issue 
resolutions encompassed situations where the issue resolution, as explained in a 
tribunal’s reasons, did not fall reasonably within the scope of the expansive or 
restrictive category for the issue.16 
 
The expansive and restrictive approaches reflected interpretive positions on legal 
issues of uncertainty or ambiguity in investment treaties. Due to divergent interests 
of investors and states, however, it is not necessarily the case that the expansive 
approach is “pro-investor” and the restrictive approach is “pro-state”. For example, 
in considering whether expansive interpretations of the treaties are pro-investor, 
would we examine the specific claimant, future claimants, or investors as a whole? 
If expansive interpretations were to lead states to withdraw from the system or if 
they undermine the system’s legitimacy then they might be said to harm investors 
as a whole while benefiting specific claimants. Likewise, a restrictive position might 
be considered anti-state if it was adopted because arbitrators who were motivated 
by a desire to protect the interests of a few powerful states. For these reasons, the 
language of pro-investor and pro-state was consciously avoided. 
 
An issues template laid out the interpretive approaches that would qualify as 
expansive or restrictive for the seven issues.17 Coding was intended to cover a 
reasonable sample of divergent approaches to issues that related to the topics of 
jurisdiction or admissibility. The template was developed based on a review of 
                                                 
15 An arbitrator was deemed to have resolved an issue where the arbitrator put his or her name to the 
reasons for an award or decision that explained the issue resolution in question. An arbitrator who gave 
separate reasons for a decision would be coded differently than other members of the tribunal where his 
or her separate reasons resolved the issue differently from other members. 
16 These non-classifiable situations included those in which (1) the issue was resolved specifically and 
expressly by the terms of the relevant treaty, (2) the claim or argument was withdrawn by a party, or 
(3) the tribunal reasoned that it was unnecessary to resolve the issue that had arisen. 
17 A copy of the issues template, laying out the expansive and restrictive approaches to each of the 
issues, is attached as Appendix A. 
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existing awards and secondary literature as well as consultations with experts in 
the field (Hall and Wright, p. 107). This approach was adopted to reduce the 
discretion of the primary legal researcher (Van Harten) in the identification of 
issues and delineation of issue resolutions, although significant discretion 
undoubtedly remained. The coding was not intended to encompass all aspects of 
the possible legal interpretation of coded issues. Rather, for each issue, one or 
more descriptions of an expansive or restrictive approach was identified and issue 
resolutions were then coded either as expansive or restrictive based on whether the 
tribunal’s interpretation fell reasonably within any one of the descriptions.  
 
The following issues were identified for coding: 
 
Corporate person investor – whether a claim would be permissible where ownership 
of the investment extends through a chain of companies running from the host to 
the home state via a third state. 
 
Natural person investor – whether a claim would be permissible where brought by a 
natural person against the only state of which the person is a citizen or against a 
state of which the person is a citizen without confirmation of dominant and effective 
nationality. 
 
Investment – whether the Fedax criteria would be applied to the concept of 
investment under the ICSID Convention or, regardless of whether under the ICSID 
Convention, whether there would be a requirement for an actual transfer of capital 
into the host state as a feature of an investment or an extension of the concept of 
investment to non-traditional categories of ownership 
 
Minority shareholder interest – whether a claim by a minority shareholder would be 
permitted where the treaty did not allow claims by minority shareholders (such as 
where the treaty did not include “shares” in the definition of investment) or without 
limiting the claim to the shareholder’s interest in the value and disposition of the 
shares (as opposed to interests of the domestic firm itself). 
 
Permissibility of investment – whether there would be an evident onus placed on 
the investor or the state to show that an investment was or was not affirmatively 
approved or was or was not based on corrupt practices. 
 
Parallel claims – whether a claim would be allowed in the face of a treaty-based 
duty to resort to local remedies that clearly had not been satisfied by the claimant; 
in the face of a contractually-agreed dispute settlement clause relating to the same 
factual dispute; in the face of an actual claim, arising from the same factual 
dispute, via the relevant path of a treaty-based fork-in-road clause; or in the face 
of an actual claim, arising from the same factual dispute, via another treaty that 
could lead to a damages award in favour of the investor. 
 
Scope of most-favoured-nation treatment – whether the concept of most-favoured-
nation treatment would be extended to non-substantive provisions of other treaties 
(such as dispute settlement provisions). 
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This sample of issues was intended to capture legal questions that had arisen in 
existing cases and that were likely to have led to different approaches by different 
arbitrators. The focus was legal issues of general significance on the basis that such 
issues can operate as signals for investors and for states of the likelihood of 
successful claims and of state liability (Trujillo, p. 364-5), in this case at the 
jurisdictional and admissibility stage. Legal issues that were highly specific to a 
single treaty or case, on the other hand, were not examined. Factual 
determinations were also excluded from the study on the basis that there is greater 
variation among facts of cases than among general legal standards. That said, the 
dividing line between law and outcome was not always clear. In some cases, based 
on the approaches adopted in existing awards, aspects of the resolution of legal 
issues were linked to aspects of the substantive outcome in a case (e.g. whether a 
particular resolution of a legal issue was accompanied by a decision to allow the 
claim to proceed). However, an issue resolution was not coded for whether it 
determined the outcome of an award. Thus, distinctions between the ratio 
decidendi and obiter dicta of a decision were avoided on the basis that they could 
be difficult to maintain and that an issue resolution, even if only obiter, could still 
give signals to future claimants and respondents based on its symbolic meaning 
(Krippendorf, p. 22). 
 
The issues template was developed in the spring and summer of 2009. It was 
recognized that over time divergences in the law may evolve or be resolved. 
Particular issues and interpretive approaches may fade in importance. Recognizing 
this, a degree of residual flexibility was maintained for exceptional cases in which 
an interpretive approach appeared to have evolved from that described in the 
issues template in ways that were nevertheless consistent with the underlying 
rationale for the classification as expansive or restrictive approaches to the 
resolution of an issue. This flexibility was exercised rarely, based on the general 
guideline that the a priori characterization of the categories needed to be 
maintained strictly but not slavishly. The flexibility was limited to cases in which the 
interpretive approach appeared clearly to build on, rather than to take in new 
directions, the a priori expansive or restrictive approach. 
 
The unit of analysis for the study was issues rather than cases. An issue-by-issue 
approach allowed an examination of the reasoning of arbitrators on a variety of 
issues that may affect a decision. However, a limitation of this approach was that it 
gave greater weight to cases in which multiple issues arose and were resolved. This 
raised the possibility of an in-built bias in favour of either expansiveness or 
restrictiveness in cases where multiple issues arose. In particular, it was thought 
that an in-built bias in favour of an expansive approach to issue resolutions might 
arise because of the need, in theory, for tribunals to reject all objections to 
jurisdiction and admissibility where a claim was allowed to proceed, and to accept 
only one such objection where a claim was rejected.  
 
C. Data sources and coding process 
 
The primary source of data was the text of awards (i.e. all decisions by a tribunal) 
in known cases decided by May 10, 2010 and publicly-available by June 1, 2010. An 
award was deemed “publicly-available” where it was posted on the Investment 
Treaty Arbitration website maintained by Andrew Newcombe of the University of 
Victoria. A case was deemed “known” where it was listed on that website with an 
indication that the case was brought under an investment treaty or where it was 
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listed as a treaty-based case on any of a series of official websites.18 In the case of 
a few fields, data was derived from sources other than the text of awards. In NAFTA 
Chapter 11 cases, for example, information on the date of claims was taken from 
materials filed by the parties rather than simply the text of awards. Also, the 
nationality of arbitrators was derived from a google search as a supplement to the 
text of awards. 
 
The coding process had two stages. One involved the collection of basic descriptive 
information on cases. The other involved a content analysis of awards. The process 
of the first stage was follows. Coding was based on a codebook that was reviewed 
periodically in order to address unanticipated permutations of the coding process.19 
The codebook included numerous fields of relatively innocuous information, of 
which the following were most relevant to the legal content analysis: name of case, 
name and nationality of claimant, name of respondent state, date of claim, dates of 
known awards in a case, and identity and nationality of arbitrators associated with 
each award in a case. Beginning in the summer of 2008, extensive descriptive data 
on known investment arbitrations was collected by three research assistants (all JD 
students) acting in sequence over a three-year period.20 The second and third 
researchers acted with knowledge of earlier coding. Thus, the descriptive data was 
double-coded, in some cases triple-coded, but not blindly. At this stage of the 
project, coder discretion was relatively limited; the discretion involved mainly how 
to resolve issues not originally anticipated and dealt with in the codebook.21 A key 
concern was to ensure that coders were well-trained in the codebook – in the 
present case, they were afforded generous time to study the codebook, an 
opportunity to practice its application on a sample of cases, detailed feedback on 
practice coding, and an ongoing opportunity to discuss issues arising from the 
application of the codebook (while retaining autonomy in the coding of specific 
cases) – and confident of the independence of their decisions as coders. 
 
Roughly 15% of the descriptive data was checked by the primary legal researcher. 
Where discrepancies were found, the data was referred back to the coder or in rare 
cases re-coded by the primary legal researcher (in the case of the fields listed 
above, only data on dates of claims was re-coded in this way). Formal inter-coder 
reliability was not tracked at this stage of the project, although periodic checks of 
the data by coders or the primary researcher revealed that errors were uncommon 
and, where they arose, were typically due to straightforward misunderstandings of 
the codebook. 
 
A more rigorous coding process was used at the legal content analysis stage. 
Following development of the issues template, a sample of cases was coded as a 
test. Next, awards were reviewed systematically in groups according to treaty type 
and, in the case of Argentina (which has faced many more claims than other 
states), the respondent state. The coding at this stage involved reading all of the 
awards in known cases in order to determine whether an issue had arisen and, if 
                                                 
18 These included the websites of ICSID, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the Energy Charter 
Treaty Secretariat, and the government websites of Canada, Mexico and the U.S. on NAFTA Chapter 11 
arbitration. 
19 Further information on the codebook is available from the author: gvanharten@osgoode.yorku.ca. 
20 All of the coders were experienced in the use of Excel and in data collection and were able to make 
useful contributions to the development of the coding process. 
21 For example, under some investment treaties, a notice of claim is filed by an investor at a date prior 
to the filing of the actual claim. In such situations, which date should be recorded as the date of the 
claim? The approach adopted was to use the earlier of the two dates as the date of the claim. 
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so, whether its resolution fit one of the expansive or restrictive approaches for that 
issue. Coding was carried out by three coders beginning in the summer of 2009. 
The first and main coder was a research assistant and JD student who coded 
independently all of the awards. The second was the primary legal researcher who 
coded independently all of the issues identified by the first coder as having arisen, 
with access to the decisions of the first coder on whether particular issues arose in 
a case. Discrepancies in the coding of issue resolutions were discussed by the two 
coders. Where the coders did not agree on the appropriate coding of the issue 
resolution, the issue was referred to a third coder who was a research assistant and 
lawyer. This third coder resolved on an independent and anonymous basis the 
remaining differences between the first two coders. 
 
As originally planned, the coding process did not envision that the second coder 
would review the first coder’s decisions that an issue had not arisen in a case. 
Instead, it was planned that an audit would be performed of a sample of cases 
under different treaties or treaty types.22 In the audit, all of the awards in the 
sampled cases were reviewed by the second coder in order to determine whether 
any issues from the template, not identified by the first coder as having arisen, had 
in fact arisen in the view of the second coder. The results of the audit – especially, 
the frequency with which issues not identified by the first coder were found to have 
arisen by the second coder23 – led to a review of all cases by the second coder. 
Where an issue was found to have arisen that had not been identified by the first 
coder, this was referred back to the first coder who reviewed the second coder’s 
decision that an issue had arisen and that it should be coded as expansive, 
restrictive, or non-classifiable. If there was a difference of views between the first 
and second coders on whether an issue had arisen and, if so, on the classification of 
the issue resolution, then this was referred to the third coder. 
 
At this second stage of the project, the collection of data involving issue resolutions 
was based on an analysis of the text of publicly-available awards. Reflecting a 
limitation of content analysis, this meant that factors and reasons not outlined in 
the written reasons were not captured in the coding (Hall and Wright, p. 100). On 
this point, to maintain consistency across cases, the data source of publicly-
available awards was not supplemented by analysis of other sources, such as 
materials filed by the parties (as are typically available under NAFTA Chapter 11) or 
scholarly or journalistic reports on particular cases. Further, a tribunal’s reasons in 
an award were examined where they engaged an issue in the issues template, 
regardless of the stage of the proceedings at which the issue arose or the manner 
in which it was characterized by the tribunal. Thus, the specific question for coders 
was whether the issue arose and, if so, how it was resolved based on the issues 
template; it was not how the issue was framed by the parties or the tribunal, 
although this clearly had a bearing on whether an issue could be found to have 
arisen. 
                                                 
22 The cases reviewed in this audit were chosen at random, using random.org, from a list of cases under 
each treaty or treaty type. Where a randomly-generated case clearly was not representative of coded 
cases, a substitute case was chosen (this occurred in one instance, where Loewen was substituted for 
Canfor on the basis that the latter dealt with issues of consolidation of cases rather than issues of 
jurisdiction or admissibility). Also, substitute cases were chosen randomly where the award(s) in a case 
was not available in English or not publicly-available. 
23 In the case of NAFTA, 4 cases were audited, leading to 0 instances in which an issue not identified by 
the first coder was found to have arisen. For the Energy Charter Treaty, 3 cases were audited, leading to 
1 instance in which an issue not identified by the first coder was found to have arisen. For BIT cases 
involving Argentina, 4 cases were audited, leading to 2 instances in which an issue not identified by the 
first coder was found to have arisen. For all other BIT cases, 19 cases were audited, leading to 9 
instances in which an issue not identified by the first coder was found to have arisen. Of these 9 
instances, 4 involved a separate opinion by an arbitrator in the case. 
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In all cases, the approach was to review cases where publicly-available awards 
were available that referred to matters of jurisdiction or admissibility. Where a 
tribunal’s award was not available in English,24 the case was not coded for legal 
content so as to maintain consistency across the three coders (who shared only 
English as a common language). Where there was no reference in any publicly-
available award to any jurisdictional or admissibility issue, the case was coded as 
not public for all issues.25 Thus, issues were coded only when they arose in the text 
of an award, meaning that, in some cases, issues arising in a case may not have 
been coded because they were dealt with by the tribunal in an award that was not 
among the publicly-available awards for the case. This was a consequence of the 
varying levels of transparency across cases and treaties. That said, it was very rare 
to see cases that had a published award which did not address jurisdictional or 
admissibility issues to some degree. 
 
The data thus included the full universe of publicly-available awards in known 
investment treaty arbitrations. As such, the coded cases reflected a sample of total 
cases, assuming that there are cases that have been decided under investment 
treaties but the existence of which is not public. There is good reason to believe 
that there are such cases.26 Thus, if the body of known awards is different from 
unknown awards, then the results of the study will be subject to case-selection bias 
(Drahozal, p. 294). For example, in order for awards in known cases to be public, 
the cases must not have been settled before the stage of a first award by a 
tribunal. And, the characteristics of the conflicts in known cases may differ from the 
characteristics of conflicts that have been settled at an earlier stage. In turn, the 
study of known awards may reflect case-selection bias in favour of certain kinds of 
investor-state disputes. Even if there are significant differences between known and 
unknown awards in treaty arbitrations, analysis of known awards remains a feasible 
method by which to identify trends in arbitrator decision-making, so long as any 
conclusions drawn are based on appropriate inferences and limited to the studied 
universe (Hall and Wright, p. 105; Krippendorf, p. 25-8). 
 
To reduce the risk of selection bias arising from the analysis of only known awards, 
the project focused on issues arising from decisions that must be made by 
arbitrators in or after an award on jurisdiction. This is likely to mitigate the problem 
of data availability, on the assumption that the existence of a case is less likely to 
remain confidential where the case has reached the stage of an award on 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, this does not address cases where an award is 
known to exist but has not been released to the public in a form that allows for 
legal content analysis of the award. This is further limitation and possible basis for 
selection bias due to the secrecy of some investment arbitrations. 
 
                                                 
24 Awards were coded where available originally in English, via an official translation to English, or via an 
unofficial translation posted on the Investment Treaty Arbitration website. 
25 Thus, in Lemire v Ukraine, the only publicly-available decision was a record of settlement by the 
parties which followed a non-public award on jurisdiction. The case was coded as not public. 
26 Besides anecdotal reports, the International Chamber of Commerce reported during 2005-2009 an 
average of 69 arbitrations per year involving a state or state entity (International Court of Arbitration). 
However, further information about such arbitrations is confidential. It is, as such, unclear how many of 
these arbitrations involving states were pursuant to investment treaties, contracts, or domestic 
legislation. 
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D. Some other methodological concerns 
 
The coding of separate opinions, whether dissenting or concurring, presented some 
challenges that were dealt with as follows. Where the separate opinion dealt with a 
code-able issue in explicit terms, then the reasons were coded separately from the 
tribunal’s main reasons. In such circumstances, where the separate opinion 
identified an issue that was dealt with in the main reasons for the award, but the 
author of the opinion did not declare a position on the issue of interpretation, then 
the issue resolution for the relevant arbitrator was coded as non-classifiable. 
However, where the separate opinion did not raise explicitly an issue that was dealt 
with in the tribunal’s main reasons, then the relevant arbitrator was assumed to 
share the view of the tribunal as a whole. In the vast majority of cases that led to 
separate opinions by arbitrators, it was not difficult to either distinguish the 
separate opinion from the tribunal’s main reasons or identify it with the tribunal’s 
main reasons. 
 
Coder discretion was an integral part of aspects of the legal content analysis and 
various steps were taken to limit and guide this discretion (Hall and Wright, p. 
109). These included the development of an a priori issues template; resort to 
external sources to generate the descriptions of interpretive approaches in the 
template; and use of a double-coding process, supplemented by a tie-breaker, to 
check coding decisions. At the legal content analysis stage of the project, 
especially, coding decisions of the first and second coders will need to be evaluated 
for inter-coder reliability. Even if there is a reasonable level of inter-coder 
reliability, however, discretionary choices will clearly have been present in various 
elements of this stage of the project. Ultimately, accountability for these coding 
decisions lies in the publication of the template and coding results, such that the 
results can be reviewed by other researchers for purposes of replication 
(Krippendorf, p. 49-50). 
 
E. Some anticipated limitations 
 
Analysis of the results of the study is ongoing and so the results are not reported 
here. However, some limitations of the study can be highlighted at this stage (see 
Wagner and Petherbridge, p. 1128-30). Fundamentally, the study seeks to assess 
tendencies in legal reasoning based on the quantification of complex processes of 
adjudicative decision-making. Such research has important limitations. First, it is 
difficult if not impossible to reduce complex qualitative and variable phenomena to 
the quantitative indicators that are required for statistical analysis (Aitken and 
Taroni, p. 203). Studies in the field deal in approximated correlations rather than 
firm conclusions. Second, the focus on jurisdiction and admissibility may make the 
results unrepresentative of other types of legal issues; this points to opportunities 
for further research. Third, there is no control group. In the present project, a 
control group might be one in which judges who enjoyed institutional safeguards of 
independence then decided cases under investment treaties. The interpretive 
approaches of these judges could then be compared to those of arbitrators in 
similar (or the same) cases. Naturally, there is no control group of judges, thus 
precluding this sort of comparison. Fourth, in investment arbitration, there is a 
gross lack of data relative to other adjudicative contexts (in which thousands or 
tens of thousands of decisions are available for analysis). Attempts at quantitative 
analysis thus tend to carry a high risk of error. 
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Finally, it is important to emphasize that the project was not intended to prove or 
disprove actual bias. Rather, the aim was to identify tentative trends in decision-
making on matters of legal interpretation. Thus, the project seeks to identify 
roughly the manoeuvring space available for the interpretation of issues in existing 
awards and secondary literature, and the positioning of the reasons of tribunals 
within that space. As the jurisprudence evolves, so too may definitions of what 
qualifies as an expansive or restrictive approach. This is especially important where, 
as in investment treaty arbitration, there is no hierarchical system of adjudicative 
decision-making, thus creating greater fluidity and less predictability in case law. At 
most, the project will offer a blurry snapshot of how arbitrators have resolved 
jurisdictional and admissibility issues in publicly-available awards. By way of 
comparison to an actual photograph, it should be possible to make out the people 
and what they are doing, but not the details of their expressions or the background 
relief. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has provided an eclectic discussion of the use of empirical methods to 
research possible bias in investment arbitration. It has pointed out benefits and 
limitations of such methods, especially in examples of quantitative research on the 
topic. An underlying point has been that empirical research is an important 
component of scholarly efforts to understand adjudicative decision-making. 
However, legal doctrine and theory also maintain important roles in delineating the 
appropriate standards by which to conceptualize fairness and integrity in 
adjudication. In this respect, the role of institutional safeguards to ensure 
independence and impartiality has been emphasized. It has also been suggested 
that an awareness of the limitations of empirical research points to further reasons 
why doctrines of judicial independence are concerned with perceived as well as 
actual bias (e.g. Locabail, p. 471-2). 
 
Empirical research in this area is at a fledgling stage. There are no dedicated 
qualitative studies on investment arbitration. Dezalay and Garth’s work on 
international arbitration has relevance although there are limitations to its 
transferability to investment arbitration. Likewise, the initial quantitative work on 
bias in investment arbitration has in some cases been presented in ways that over-
state or mis-state conclusions about actual bias. An alternative methodology of 
empirical research has been presented here as an option for supplementing other 
methodologies. It takes the form of a legal content analysis of the reasoning in 
awards. Legal content analysis may avoid important limitations of outcome-based 
research and, as such, an opportunity to triangulate data and methods (Berg, p. 4-
6; Hall and Wright, p. 82-3). A further benefit is that it appears to provide a more 
value-added role for legal expertise in quantitative research. On the other hand, 
legal content analysis is complex and discretionary, and thus reliant for its validity 
on the rigour and transparency of the coding process.  
 
Ideally, a range of methods and data sources would be used in complementary 
ways to elaborate theoretical expectations about bias in investment arbitration and 
seek to triangulate data, methods, and theories. That said, it will be a very long 
time before we achieve a mature body of empirical work on investment arbitration. 
Moreover, even when mature, the empirical work will not provide definitive proof of 
the presence or absence of actual bias in particular cases (Sisk and Heise, p. 746 
and 794). Researchers must take great care to avoid unsupported claims about 
actual bias and to condition statements of the limitations of their research 
accordingly. Empirical methods should also not be used to give false assurances 
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that concerns about perceived bias in investment arbitration – arising from the 
absence of institutional safeguards otherwise present in the final resolution of public 
law – have been addressed based on statistical analysis of outcomes. 
 
The criticisms of some empirical studies, as conveyed in this paper, are not meant 
as a wider criticism of the use of empirical methods. Rather, the aim here is to 
support an appropriately modest and refined use of empirical methods in order to 
make observations that would be impossible without the systematic collection of 
data. Used with care, empirical research can contribute to the understanding of 
social phenomena and support an evolution of doctrines and design of institutions 
toward the goal of fair and accurate decision-making. 
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Appendix A 
 
Investment treaty arbitration – issues template – June 2009 
 
Issue 1: ‘corporate person investor’ – 
expansive approach 
Issue 1: ‘corporate person investor’ – 
restrictive approach 
Flexible approach to claims by corporate 
persons, indicated by: 
 
(a) flexible approach to claims by foreign 
holding companies, including: 
 
(1) prioritization of corporate form over 
control of the investment vehicle or 
rejection of an implied origin-of-
capital test. 
(2) allowance of a claim by a foreign 
company that is owned and likely 
controlled by nationals of the host 
state. 
(3) allowance of a claim by a 
shareholder whose investment in 
the host state is owned by an 
intermediary company of a third 
state. 
 
Note: allowance of a claim by a foreign 
company or natural person whose 
ownership of the investment extends 
through a chain of companies running from 
the host state to the home state, but does 
not extend into any third state or end in the 
host state, does not qualify as an expansive 
approach. 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where 
the issue is dealt with expressly and 
specifically in the text of the relevant 
investment treaty and this forms the basis 
of the tribunal’s reasoning. On the present 
issue, a treaty does not satisfy this 
threshold unless it expressly and 
specifically allows claims by foreign holding 
companies regardless of their ultimate 
ownership and control. A treaty that refers 
generally to ‘direct and indirect’ ownership 
of the investment (thus dealing with 
Barcelona Traction) does not satisfy this 
threshold. 
 
 
Note: a tribunal’s reasoning on minority 
shareholder claims and interests may relate 
to the issue of ‘corporate person investor’ 
and to that of ‘minority shareholder 
interest’ (see below). A degree of coding 
overlap may therefore be unavoidable, 
leading in some cases to entry of an award 
under both issues. That said, a distinction 
should be maintained between these issues, 
where possible, on the basis that the 
Restrictive approach to claims by corporate 
persons, indicated by: 
 
(a) restrictive approach to claims by foreign 
holding companies, including: 
 
(1) use of veil-piercing or of an indirect 
control test or of a substantial 
connection text in order to preclude 
jurisdiction/ admissibility. 
(2) refusal of a claim by a foreign 
company that is owned and likely 
controlled by nationals of the host 
state. 
(3) refusal of a claim by a shareholder 
whose investment in the host state is 
owned by an intermediary company of 
a third state. 
 
Note: refusal of a claim by a foreign company 
or natural person whose ownership of the 
investment extends through a chain of 
companies running from the host state to the 
home state, even where it does not extend 
into any third state or end in the host state, 
nevertheless does qualify as a restrictive 
approach. 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where the 
issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and 
this forms the basis of the tribunal’s 
reasoning. On the present issue, a treaty does 
not satisfy this threshold unless it expressly 
and specifically precludes claims by foreign 
holding companies on the basis of their 
particular ownership and control or it 
expressly and specifically provides for 
application of the relevant test outlined in (1) 
above. 
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reasoning will relate to (1) the issue of 
‘corporate person investor’ where the claim 
involves the use of a holding company, 
whether or not by a minority shareholder, 
so as to facilitate a claim where it might not 
otherwise be possible, or (2) the issue of 
‘minority shareholder interest’ where the 
claim has been brought by a minority 
shareholder of the domestic investment, 
thus necessarily raising the issue of the 
nature and scope of the claimant’s interest 
as a minority shareholder. 
Issue 2: ‘natural person investor’ – 
expansive approach  
Issue 2: ‘natural person investor’ – 
restrictive approach  
Flexible approach to claims by natural 
persons, indicated by: 
 
(a) allowance of claim against the only 
state of which the claimant is a citizen; 
 
OR 
 
(b) allowance of claim against a state of 
which the claimant is a citizen without 
conformation that the citizenship upon 
which the claim is based is dominant and 
effective. 
 
OR 
 
(c) allowance of claim based on flexible 
application of the requirement for foreign 
nationality as customarily applied to natural 
persons. 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where 
the issue is dealt with expressly and 
specifically in the text of the relevant 
investment treaty and this forms the basis 
of the tribunal’s reasoning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Restrictive approach to claims by natural 
persons, indicated by: 
 
(a) refusal of claim against the only state of 
which the claimant is a citizen; 
 
OR 
 
(b) refusal of claim against a state of which 
the claimant is a citizen following confirmation 
that the citizenship upon which the claim is 
based is not dominant and effective. 
 
OR 
 
(c) refusal of claim based on strict application 
of the requirement for foreign nationality as 
customarily applied to natural persons. 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where the 
issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and 
this forms the basis of the tribunal’s 
reasoning. 
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Issue 3: ‘concept of investment’ – 
expansive approach 
Issue 3: ‘concept of investment’ – 
restrictive approach 
Flexible approach to concept of 
‘investment’, indicated by: 
 
(a) where a claim is under the ICSID 
Convention, non-application of the Fedax 
criteria, including by focusing primarily on 
the definition of investment in the BIT or 
other investment treaty (a.k.a. subjective 
theory of investment under ICSID); 
 
OR 
 
(b) where the claim is under the ICSID 
Convention, liberal application of the Fedax 
criteria to include as ‘investment’ any 
activities that are stand-alone and that go 
beyond conventional FDI project activities, 
in line with ‘the liberal movement, 
favourable to an extension of the 
jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals to every kind 
of economic rights’ (Yala, p. 108); 
 
OR 
 
(c) whether or not the claim is under the 
ICSID Convention, rejection of any 
requirement for actual transfer of capital 
into the respondent state as a feature of 
investment (unless there are extenuating 
circumstances such as corrupt practices 
that block an investor from doing so); 
 
OR 
 
(d) whether or not the claim is under the 
ICSID Convention, inclusion of non-
traditional categories of ownership within 
the concept of ‘investment’, e.g. sales 
office, market share, or corporate 
governance rights in contract where the 
asset is not part of conventional FDI project 
activities. 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where 
the issue is dealt with expressly and 
specifically in the text of the relevant 
investment treaty and this forms the basis 
of the tribunal’s reasoning. On the present 
issue, a treaty that expressly and clearly 
incorporates the relevant asset that is 
included by the tribunal as part of a non-
traditional conception of ‘investment’ will 
satisfy this threshold unless the claim is an 
ICSID claim and either (a) or (b) above 
apply. 
 
 
 
 
 
Restrictive approach to concept of 
‘investment’, indicated by: 
 
(a) where a claim is under the ICSID 
Convention, strict application of the Fedax 
criteria (i.e. rejection of subjective theory 
focusing primarily on the definition of 
investment in the BIT or other investment 
treaty) to limit ‘investment’ to conventional 
FDI project activities or otherwise to deny 
claim; 
 
OR 
 
(b) whether or not the claim is under the 
ICSID Convention, adoption of a requirement 
for actual transfer of capital into the 
respondent state as a feature of investment; 
 
OR 
 
(c) whether or not the claim is under the 
ICSID convention, exclusion of non-traditional 
categories of ownership where not linked 
directly to conventional FDI project activities. 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where the 
issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and 
this forms the basis of the tribunal’s 
reasoning. 
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Issue 4: ‘minority shareholder interest’ 
– expansive approach  
Issue 4: ‘minority shareholder interest’ – 
restrictive approach  
Flexible approach to claims by minority 
shareholders, indicated by: 
 
(a) allowance of claim by a minority 
shareholder without limiting the claim to 
the shareholder’s interest in the value and 
disposition of the shares (as opposed to 
interests of the domestic firm as a whole). 
 
OR 
 
(b) allowance of claim by a minority 
shareholder where the treaty does not 
clearly and specifically allow it. 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where 
the issue is dealt with expressly and 
specifically in the text of the relevant 
investment treaty and this forms the basis 
of the tribunal’s reasoning. On (b) above, 
most treaties allow expressly and 
specifically claims by minority shareholders 
by defining investment to include ownership 
of stock or shares in a domestic company. 
Restrictive approach to claims by minority 
shareholders, indicated by: 
 
(a) limitation of such a claim to the extent of 
the claimant’s minority shareholder interest in 
the value and disposition of the shares; 
 
OR 
 
(a) preclusion of claim by a minority 
shareholder due to lack of control over the 
investment (in circumstances where, for 
example, the treaty does not define 
investment to include ownership of stock or 
shares in a domestic company). 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where the 
issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and 
this forms the basis of the tribunal’s 
reasoning.  
 
Issue 5: ‘permissibility of investment’ 
– expansive approach  
Issue 5: ‘permissibility of investment’ – 
restrictive approach  
Flexible approach to approval/ permissibility 
of ‘investment’, indicated by: 
 
(a) Evident onus on state to show that 
investment was not affirmatively approved 
or was based on corrupt practices. 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where 
the issue is dealt with expressly and 
specifically in the text of the relevant 
investment treaty and this forms the basis 
of the tribunal’s reasoning. 
Restrictive approach to approval/ 
permissibility of ‘investment’, indicated by: 
 
(a) Evident onus on investor to show that 
investment was affirmatively approved or was 
not based on corrupt practices. 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where the 
issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and 
this forms the basis of the tribunal’s 
reasoning. 
Issue 6: ‘parallel claims’ – expansive 
approach  
Issue 6: ‘parallel claims’ – restrictive 
approach  
Flexible approach to parallel claims, 
indicated by: 
 
(a) allowance of treaty claim in the face of: 
 
(1) a treaty-based duty to exhaust (or 
other claim-related condition such 
as a time-limited duty to pursue) 
local remedies which has clearly not 
been satisfied by the claimant, 
whether or not the claim relates to 
Restrictive approach to parallel claims, 
indicated by: 
 
(a) refusal or delay (in order to permit 
resolution of aspects of the dispute in another 
forum) of a treaty claim in face of: 
 
(1) a [treaty-based] duty to exhaust (or 
other claim-related condition such as a 
time-limited duty to pursue) local 
remedies which has clearly not been 
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a contract. 
(2) a contractually-agreed dispute 
settlement clause that was 
consented to by the claimant or a 
closely related company, where the 
claim appears to relate to a 
contractual dispute but regardless 
of whether any claim has been 
brought in the contractually-agreed 
forum and regardless of whether 
the treaty claim is based on an 
umbrella clause. 
(3) a fork-in-road clause, where the 
claimant or a closely related 
company (‘closely related’ meaning 
a company owned and likely 
controlled by the investor) has 
brought a parallel claim via the 
relevant ‘path’ of the fork-in-road 
(i.e. in a domestic court or a 
domestic or international tribunal, 
according to the relevant path of 
the fork-in-road) and the claim 
arises from the same underlying 
factual dispute 
(4) an actual claim pursuant to another 
treaty [that can lead to a damages 
award in favour of the investor], 
arising from the same factual 
dispute. 
 
Note: allowance of treaty claims in any of 
these circumstances will typically be based 
on the strict application of the lis pendens 
or res judicata rule, using a civil law-based 
‘triple identity’ test to require that (i) the 
parties, (ii) the cause of action, and (iii) the 
dispute all be identical before a parallel 
treaty claim can be stayed. 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where 
the issue is dealt with expressly and 
specifically in the text of the relevant 
investment treaty and this forms the basis 
of the tribunal’s reasoning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
satisfied by the claimant, whether or 
not the claim relates to a contract. 
(2) a contractually-agreed dispute 
settlement clause, where the claim 
appears to relate to the contract but 
regardless of whether or not any claim 
has been brought in the contractually-
agreed forum and regardless of 
whether the treaty claim is based on 
an umbrella clause. 
(3) a fork-in-road clause, where the 
claimant or a closely related company 
has brought a parallel claim via the 
relevant path of the fork-in-road and 
the claim arises from the same 
underlying factual dispute. 
(4) an actual claim pursuant to another 
treaty, arising from the same factual 
dispute. 
 
Note: refusal or delay of a treaty claim in any 
of these circumstances may be based on a 
flexible approach to lis pendens or res 
judicata, common law doctrines of issue 
estoppel or forum non conveniens, abuse of 
process, incorporation of an effective duty to 
resort to local remedies as a component of a 
substantive standard, or the rationale that a 
fork-in-road clause entails a choice by the 
claimant not only of forum but also of 
available remedies and causes of action (i.e. 
the investor (and closely related companies) 
can choose to bring either a treaty claim or a 
claim before a domestic court or domestic or 
international tribunal, but not both). 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where the 
issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and 
this forms the basis of the tribunal’s 
reasoning. 
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Issue 7: ‘scope of MFN treatment’ – 
expansive approach 
Issue 7: ‘scope of MFN treatment’ – 
restrictive approach 
Flexible approach to most-favoured-nation 
treatment, indicated by: 
 
(a) extension of MFN to non-substantive/ 
treatment-oriented provisions of other 
treaties (e.g. so as to include dispute 
settlement provisions of other treaties). 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where 
the issue is dealt with expressly and 
specifically in the text of the relevant 
investment treaty and this forms the basis 
of the tribunal’s reasoning. On the present 
issue, this threshold is crossed where the 
treaty states explicitly that the MFN clause 
either does or does not apply to the dispute 
settlement (or other non-substantive/ 
treatment-oriented) provisions in other 
treaties. If the treaty makes a more general 
statement, for example that the MFN clause 
applies to ‘all matters’ or to matters of 
‘treatment’ in other treaties, then this does 
not satisfy this threshold for an express and 
specific resolution of the issue. 
Restrictive approach to most-favoured-nation 
treatment, indicated by: 
 
(a) refusal to extend MFN to non-substantive/ 
treatment-oriented provisions of other treaties 
(e.g. so as to include dispute settlement 
provisions of other treaties). 
 
Note: an award is non-classifiable where the 
issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in 
the text of the relevant investment treaty and 
this forms the basis of the tribunal’s 
reasoning. 
 
 
 
 
 
